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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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Incentive Contracts: The Attributes that Matter Most in Driving 
Favorable Outcomes 
  
Presenter:  Robert L. Tremaine, is an Associate Dean for Outreach and Performance Support at the 
Defense Acquisition University’s West Region campus in San Diego, CA. He is an Air Force Academy 
graduate and holds a Master’s of Science in Systems Management (Research and Development) from 
the Air Force Institute of Technology.  He is a retired Air Force colonel with over 25 years’ experience in 
air, missile, and space weapon systems acquisition.  
 
Abstract 
Incentive contracts have been in place for many years.  They represent just one of 
many contractual tools the Department of Defense has at its disposal to drive certain 
performance behaviors. Lately, the usefulness of incentive contracts has come into question.  
The dividends have not been readily apparent.  This research study set out to determine what 
generally afforded strong correlations between incentive-type contracts and expected 
performance outcomes.  Twenty-five weapon system acquisition programs offices were 
interviewed in various stages of their acquisition lifecycles.  A standardized questionnaire-
survey was used to capture the data. This presentation prepared for the Fourth Annual 
Acquisition Research Symposium will address the findings and include a few key 
recommendations intended to better arm the acquisition workforce on the use of incentive 
contracts. 
Discussion 
In the past several years, major weapon system development programs have drawn 
significant attention.  The reasons are varied.  In some cases, costs have skyrocketed; 
schedules have experienced significant delays; and performance levels have failed to meet 
government expectations despite the employment of management tools designed to control 
costs, preserve schedules and influence performance outcomes.  Some of these management 
tools (including contractual measures, as originally conceived and specified by the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FARs)) can give tremendous flexibility to the implementation of 
government contracts.  The use of such contractual measures is one of many handy tools in a 
program manager’s toolkit to help drive performance behavior.  However, the GAO recently 
identified an apparent disconnect between the use of certain measures like incentives and 
expected outcomes in weapon system acquisitions.  In short, it appeared that incentives were 
not driving performance outcomes as originally envisioned. 
So, what about incentives?  Are they still a good tool to drive performance behaviors 
despite the recent criticism and doubt?  Have organizations found a way to effectively apply 
incentives and demonstrate the usefulness of incentives?  The answer to all of these questions 
is, “yes.”  There is no “one size fits all,” but the incentive attributes that seemed to matter the 
most in influencing performance outcomes for the 25 programs, and generally afforded strong 
correlations between incentives and desired performance were indicated by the findings. 
  




Strongly Communicated Expectations and Feedback:  Frequent and unambiguous 
communication/feedback made a noticeable difference for incentive contracts. Even 
though incentive contracts require some additional administrative burden, the outcome justified 
the increased workload of feedback for most programs under this research review.  Continuous 
and open dialogue at both junior and senior levels led to early discovery and timely 
reconciliation of many known issues and helped keep a program on track. 
Metrics: The selection of key and enduring measures within an evaluation period 
and of measures that could be connected to subsequent evaluation periods made a 
noticeable difference for incentive contracts. Key measures can validate whether or not a 
program achieved certain necessary intermediate milestones along a program’s critical glide 
path.  They confirm program momentum.  They served as an early warning system—a bell 
weather—and answer the age old question, “Are we on track”?  They also fill a huge role as 
performance benchmarks.  Those interviewed under this research project said when they 
effectively employed key measures, such tools also helped them navigate their program 
pathway despite the unavoidable programmatic turbulence.  Their measures surfaced either as 
two types: objective and/or subjective.  Without question, selecting the correct type of measures 
presented the biggest challenge.  The ability to hard-wire them to achievable outcomes makes 
objective measures like Technical Performance Measures (TPMs), Cost Performance Indices 
(CPIs), Schedule Performance Indices (SPIs), etc., invaluable gauges.  They served as 
tremendous forecasting devices when they were carefully connected to outcomes.   
Base Fee:  The incorporation of base fee in award-fee contracts made a noticeable 
difference.  Of the 25 organizational interviews, many used some form of base fee on cost-
plus-award-fee contracts.  Numerous organizations implementing cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) 
valued base fees as a leverage tool.  Even though the Federal Acquisition Supplement 
(DFARS) 216.405-2(c)(iii) allows up to 3% of the estimated cost of the contract exclusive of fee, 
a contractor could provide “best efforts” for the award-fee term and still receive no award.  As a 
result, there was some pressure on the government to provide a portion of the award fee for 
“best efforts.”  Further, our research team found that senior defense industry personnel 
welcomed the use of base fee to better delineate the difference between “best efforts” (e.g., fee) 
and “excellence” (e.g., award). 
Trained and Experienced Personnel: Training and experience made a noticeable 
difference for incentive contracts.  Nothing seems to have a more dramatic impact in DoD 
like training and experience.  Training draws it roots from practical experience.  It’s systematic.  
We learn from our successes and failures in the field and make adjustments accordingly in the 
way we train.  The mantra, “we train like we fight and fight like we train” is pervasive within the 
warfighter arena and, ultimately, leads to advantages on the battlefield.  Without question, 
practical experience helps build better training programs.  It can overcome unforeseen shortfalls 
and the inevitable prevailing uncertainty even within proven systems.  It’s no different for 
incentive-type contracts.  Organizations that had formalized instruction and/or coached their 
personnel on the use of incentives indicated such training more favorably influenced outcomes. 
The exploitation of an increasingly popular collaborative medium called Communities of 
Practices (CoPs) on the DAU Acquisition Community Connection offers access to these 
particular techniques and an even wider array of current experiences and lessons learned 
regarding incentives ranging from the general to the specific. The DAU has already established 
a site on the ACC, Award and Incentive Fee Contracts. See  
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(https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=105550).  These and other collaborative 
training aids are critical because once an incentive strategy is in place, its maximum value truly 
depends on its ability to implement techniques that drive favorable outcomes.  There’s no better 
source of experts who face contract incentive challenges every day than the acquisition 
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